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“To give a name to a thing is gratifying … but it is also dangerous: The 
danger consists in one’s becoming convinced that all is taken care of 
and that once named the phenomenon has also been explained” Primo 
Levi 
“The concept has increasingly been overworked, debased and almost 
done to death. By a process of the inflation of vocabulary what formerly 
might be termed a ‘shift’ or a ‘change’ becomes a ‘revolution’ to win a 
place in the sun for his own specialized wedge of research” Porter and 
Teich 
 
The volume of research output on management revolutions is growing at an alarming 
rate. For example, since 1997, the Library of Congress has amassed over 4,500 new 
books, journals and articles on this theme that cover subjects as diverse as information 
technology, organizational change, organizational culture, quality, customer service, 
human resource management, marketing, operations, logistics, the environment, 
organizational learning and innovation. More recently, there has been a significant 
growth in the volume of literature on revolutions in both the theory and practice of 
strategic management. What becomes clear, from even the most cursory examination 
of this management literature on change and transformation, is the perceived need for 
organizations to in some way or other reinvent themselves; the modern turbulence 
created by technology, globalisation and all the rest requires new forms of 
organizational behaviour and management. The net result of all this is that change has 
become the most important item on the agenda of modern management. Where 
previous management gurus talked about Japanisation and incremental change 
(Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) or excellence and continuous change (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982) now the gurus talk about transformation and revolution (Hamel, 
2000) and what follows these changes in prescription is a concomitant dramatisaton 
and sensationalisation of the language used. 
 
This exponential rise in the use of revolutionary language may prove Levi’s point 
that, if we want to really understand a phenomenon, we need to do more than just give 
it a name and should avoid the use of glib catch phrases and clichés. Central to the 
debate on the manager as revolutionary is the complex issue of what drives it and the 
motivations and outcomes behind it. Is it, on the one hand, organizational necessity 
brought about by the revolutionary changes that are taking place in the modern world 
or is it, for those who are more skeptical of these kind of changes, a result of little 
more than management hubris? J. K. Galbraith argued that, for many economists “it is 
a far, far better thing to have a firm anchor in nonsense than to put out on the 
troubled sea of thought” and, as Meier (1996) has argued, this new school of 
management may reflect much the same thing; it could be little more than an attempt 
to reaffirm the centrality of management in organizational discourse at a time when 
the power to act coexists, paradoxically, with a powerlessness to change anything. 
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The revolutionary school assumes that descriptive models can have prescriptive 
power and, rather than unravelling the Gordian Knot, there is an increasing focus on 
cutting through it via the adoption of off-the-peg solutions that can somehow 
transform a stable organisation into a revolutionary organisation. Like Fromm (1960) 
we would argue for the inadequacy of “reciting optimistic formulae” and it may also 
be a useful illustration of Porter and Teich’s point about the purpose of management 
research being the promotion of output rather than ideas. This notion is reinforced by 
Chaharbaghi and Willis (1998) who argue that a great deal of management research is 
part of a “model making industry” which has “no real purpose”. 
 
The aim of this article is to dissect some of the key elements of this revolutionary 
school of management by analyzing it from a European perspective. The article is 
organized in a fairly straightforward way. It will first consider the political origins of 
revolutions before examining some of the key themes and texts that draw on these 
origins. It will then consider two case studies of European revolutions in action: The 
revolution in the European business environment over the past decade and a half and 
more recent attempts at transformation in Ford’s European operations. The article will 
conclude by considering some of the implications of this trend. A central theme that 
runs through the article is that talk of revolutions in management often misses a 
number of key points about both the political origins of the term and the activity that 
it describes. The article will argue that the revolutionary school may offer a 
misleading description of the current age and, therefore, an inappropriate prescription 
for strategies to meet the challenges of the current age. 
 
Lost in the Translation: The political origins of the management 
revolution 
 
“The revolution cannot draw its power from the past, but only from the 
future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped itself of all 
superstitions concerning the past” Karl Marx 
“A set of principles laid down more than two centuries ago has shaped 
the structure, management and performance of businesses throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We say that the time has come to 
retire those principles and to adopt a new set” Hammer and Champy 
 
Hegel argued that success of any type, including successful revolutions, requires a 
good theory. In this section of the article we will consider the theoretical origins of the 
revolutionary school of management and the concept of revolution. In particular we 
will compare and contrast some of the key elements and themes of the political and 
management schools. The section will show that, in respect to language and 
terminology, there are some similarities between the two schools and the main source 
of this similarity is in the expressions of radical change. However, the section will 
also argue that the management school has done little more than replicate the 
language of revolution and has paid scant regard to the activity or process of 
revolutions: In making the shift from politics to management there has been a 
substantial dilution of the intellectual rigour which underpins the political concept of 
revolution. 
 
An interesting, and relevant, diversion from the political concept of revolution is a 
consideration of the engineering concept of revolution that may, in any case, predate 
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the political term. In engineering the concept can be defined as a single and complete 
orbit. This definition has relevance if we consider one of the earliest usages of the 
term in a political sphere that came in 1688 with the Glorious Revolution and the 
accession to the throne of William of Orange. This first example of political 
revolution was a response, not to the inequities or irrelevance of the status quo, but 
rather to change bought about by James II’s increasing toleration of the Roman 
Catholic church: In its first usage, therefore, a political revolution was about restoring 
an established order rather than the creation of a new and different one. 
 
Whilst we recognise that revolution as both a concept and activity, in whatever sphere 
it is examined, is a complicated one that defies simple and emphatic definitions, we 
also point out that the Glorious Revolution is a stark contrast to the current acceptance 
of what denotes a revolution. For example, Giddens (1989) suggests that a revolution 
has three key characteristics. First, a revolution must involve a mass movement, 
second, violence is a key component of revolution either by threat or by action and, 
finally, the revolution must lead a major process of change and reform. This final 
component of revolution may be relatively uncontroversial but the same does not 
necessarily apply to the first two elements. For example, Burleigh (2000) places more 
emphasis on small groups and “marginal sects” in the early stages of a revolution that 
provides the foundations of the mass movements of Giddens. Calvert (1967, 1970) 
approaches the concept of revolution from a different direction and proposes a 
framework for analysis which suggests that there are four key aspects of a revolution. 
The revolution has a process which defines the way in which the activity is carried 
out, the revolution has an event which signifies a starting point or moment of crisis, 
the revolution has a programme which defines the objectives and hoped for outcomes 
and, lastly, the revolution has a “political myth” which suggests that, whilst it may be 
an idea that forms an important part of the beliefs of different groups, it is not 
necessarily founded on fact. 
 
Having established the complexity of the concept, we now turn to consider some of 
the key elements of the concept from the literature that offers a commentary on 
political revolutions. In doing this we would immediately point out that we are not 
creating a definitive list of revolutionary characteristics but are, instead, creating an 
illustrative list against which the management school can be compared. To do this we 
will examine four common descriptors of political revolutions. Political revolutions 
are rare and characterized by infrequency. They are, to a large extent, unpredictable 
and, hence, uncontrollable. Revolutions in both theory and practice are not always 
positive and welcome and, finally, revolutions tend to lead not to change but to 
counter-revolutionary reactions. 
 
Despite the huge volume of literature on revolutions, we should not lose sight of the 
fact that they are not regular events. Burleigh draws attention to their rarity and argues 
that this rarity is explained by the conditions required for a revolution to occur. These 
conditions are the presence of a revolutionary messiah and the appearance of some 
sort of ontological crisis. The idea of revolutions requiring a certain set of conditions 
is echoed in elements of the Marxist view which draws attention to economic or class 
based crises and the Leninist view which draws attention to the importance of the 
revolutionary agent. Once the revolution has begun, a significant body of commentary 
suggests that it will act in an unpredictable and uncontrollable manner. For instance, 
Skocpol (1979) suggests that revolutionary activity develops its own momentum and 
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behaves in a manner which may be beyond the influence of the revolutionary; “it is 
not the revolutionaries who make revolutions, revolutions are non-voluntary”. This 
view further reinforces that of Giddens who drew attention to the violent nature of 
revolution and the unpredictability that often accompanies any violent act. 
 
The rarity of revolutions is, therefore, explained by some as a consequence of the 
circumstances that must be in place before revolution can occur. Their rarity could 
also be explained by their fundamentally negative nature. For Skocpol this negativity 
begins at the start of the process as revolutions are built more on the weaknesses of an 
existing system than on any positive actions. More dramatically, Brinton (1952) 
draws similarities between revolutions and fevers and argues that, like any illness, the 
best response is to cure it rather than promote it. This is supported by Edwards (1970) 
who makes the further point that a possible positive outcome of revolution is that 
those affected by this type of fever may be become immunised from its effects. 
Therefore, future revolutions may be difficult to deliver. This raises the final point of 
counter-revolution and reaction which is certainly supported by experience. Here, we 
can draw attention to the outcomes of the Russian and French revolutions and use 
them to reinforce our earlier Glorious Revolution perspective. For example, the 
outcome of the Russian Revolution was not the communist utopia dreamt of by Marx 
but the emergence of the Red Czar, the five-year plans, one-party domination, mass 
murder and uniformity. Likewise, the French Revolution led to The Terror, the 
Emperor and the Napoleonic codes, which brought about greater order and uniformity 
than ever existed under the Bourbons. 
 
The political perspective of revolutions is, therefore, complex and, at times, 
confusing. One key question that requires further investigation concerns the extent to 
which this political approach has translated well into a management approach. Is it 
time to discard our copies of Drucker, Moss Kanter and Mintzberg and replace them 
with Marx, Trotsky and Lenin? Skocpol has already questioned the appropriateness of 
much social scientific treatment of revolutions and argues that the “revolutionary 
process itself was envisaged in ways that correspond very poorly to the histories” and 
this was because explanations focused on “models of how political protest and change 
were ideally supposed to occur” rather than on what happened in reality. We can 
examine this point further by considering some of the key elements of the 
revolutionary school of management and we will begin with the terminological 
similarity between these two approaches in their treatment of change. 
 
If, as De Wit and Meyer (1998) argue, strategy is about the realization of change, then 
it may not be surprising that the management revolutionaries make use of this 
political concept of revolution. This is because traditional theories of organizational 
and strategic change have, perhaps, become disconnected from practice and what is 
happening in the real world. These traditional theories usually focus on either 
extrapolation of the past to predict the future or emulation of the successful to deliver 
a competitive advantage. The revolutionary school of management generally argues 
that these are inappropriate approaches to strategy formation because the world is now 
a very different place and subject to ever more dramatic and turbulent changes. This is 
the first assumption on which this school rests; we live in revolutionary times. 
Following on from this is a second assumption which runs through much of the 
literature; organizations must become much more revolutionary in their strategy 
making, in particular, organizations should foster internal conditions of permanent 
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revolution. The final assumption of the revolutionary school is that the main agents of 
revolution are managers who must think and act in a more creative and innovative 
way. 
 
Before examining these assumptions in more detail it is important to place them into a 
broader context. A substantial proportion of the revolutionary school pays attention to 
two related change forces that organizations must contend with. First, the school has 
developed against a backdrop of globalization and, second, it has developed during a 
period of apparent rapid technological change. In considering the globalization 
context of management revolutions, we do not have the time or space in an article of 
this length to engage in the debate on the processes and forms of globalization and, 
instead, would simply offer some illustrations of the debate. Held and McGrew (2000) 
argue that “the phenomenon of globalization has captured the public imagination … 
globalization has become the leitmotif of our age” yet despite the prominence of the 
issue there is little consensus about what it means, what is driving it and what the 
outcomes of it will be. The management revolution is taking place during a period of 
uncertainty “where the rules are in flux – and not clearly known” (Thurow, 1996). 
 
With the odd exception (for example Hirst and Thompson, 1999) much of the 
literature on globalization starts with the a priori assumption that it is different and 
new. Moss Kanter (1996) talks about “sweeping changes in the competitive 
landscape”, Prahalad and Doz (1986) discussed a world “beyond the analysis of 
existing rules” and Taniguchi (1995) explained a world that was “unpredicted and 
unpredictable, and it remains in flux”. The consensus that things are changing is 
matched by a broad agreement that something has to be done about it. Ohmae (1989), 
for example, argues that, as globalization creates new challenges, then “we must 
globalize to meet them” and, in doing so, Moss Kanter argues that organizations need 
to “re-think their strategies and structures”. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987) offer an 
almost revolutionary prescription because this means “not only a total strategic re-
orientation but a major change in organizational capability as well”. All of this is 
pretty uncontroversial strategic management in a global context: Organizations must 
change with their environments. 
 
A more controversial debate is in what drives globalization and this raises the issue of 
technological change which is often used by the management revolutionaries. In our 
revolutionary school, technology matters for two reasons. First, it is a significant 
catalyst for revolutions and, second, it can be the means through which the revolution 
is managed and directed. One of the earliest examples from this revolutionary school 
(Levitt, 1983) argued that there was a force driving us towards “a new commercial 
reality … and that force is technology” and Giddens (1999) argues that, in a 
globalizing world, we must have “a much more active or engaged relationship with 
technology than used to be the case”. On a more populist note, Pritchett (1998) draws 
attention to the revolution in information technology and explains that “Computer 
power is now 8,000 times less expensive than it was 30 years ago. If we had similar 
progress in automotive technology, today you could buy a Lexus for about $2. It 
would travel at the speed of sound and go about 600 miles on a thimble of gas”. 
 
Given the volume of literature available on management revolutions, in shifting the 
focus from context to specifics the difficult part is in knowing where to begin. A brief 
consideration of the Harvard Business Review suggests that an important theme of the 
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management revolutionaries is dealing with the obstacles to organizational 
transformation. For example, Beer and Nohria (2000) suggest; “Today’s fast paced 
economy demands that businesses change or die. But few companies manage 
corporate transformations as well as they would like”. One possible explanation of 
this problem is given by Collins (1999) who argues that corporate executives fail in 
transformation because even “with the best of intentions, they install layers of 
stultifying bureaucracy”. The need for a more revolutionary approach to 
transformation is given by Pascale et al. (1997) who point out the weaknesses of an 
incremental approach; “More and more companies struggle with growing competition 
by introducing improvements into every aspect of performance. But the treadmill 
keeps moving faster, the companies keep working harder, and results improve slowly 
or not at all”. A more useful approach than a general description of the revolutionary 
arguments is a more specific explanation of some of the key texts of the revolutionary 
school to see how they draw on the influence of the political revolutionaries. 
 
Two of the most important texts in the revolutionary school are Hammer and 
Champy’s (1995) Reengineering the Corporation and Gary Hamel’s (2000) Leading 
the Revolution and these will form the basis of our analysis. We have chosen these 
texts for four reasons. First, whilst they are a small sample, they are broadly indicative 
and representative of the revolutionary school of management. Second, both sets of 
authors are widely praised as experts in their field: Hamel, according to The 
Economist, is “the world’s reigning strategy guru” and Hammer is the management 
guru of choice for Business Week. Third, just as the authors have a wide currency, so 
too do their books: Reengineering the Corporation has spent weeks on the New York 
Times bestseller list and the founders and CEOs of leading corporations have 
endorsed Leading the Revolution. Finally, both books share a similar structure and 
process of argument that involves establishing the need for revolution, explaining the 
processes of revolution and illustrating best practices in revolutions. 
 
In establishing the need for revolution, Hammer and Champy argue “Advanced 
technologies, the disappearance of boundaries between national markets and the 
altered expectations of customers who now have more choices than ever before have 
combined to make the goals, methods and basic organizing principles sadly obsolete”. 
This view of the world is echoed in Hamel’s work when he argues that;  “We stand on 
the threshold of a new age - the age of revolution ... change has changed. No longer is 
it additive ... Today we live in a world that is all punctuation and no equilibrium”. For 
Hammer and Champy this is driven by changes to customer expectations, multi-
dimensional and intensified international competition and constant, ever faster 
change. Hamel’s interpretation of the world is driven by factors such as technological 
advance, the reduced cost of technology, globalization and bare-knuckle capitalism, 
the Internet, deregulation and privatization. 
 
Having established the need for revolution, the next step in the argument is to 
establish how the revolutionary change or transformation should be carried out. 
Discussion of change within organizations is often driven by the difference between 
the continuous and discontinuous paradigms. According to Mintzberg et al. (1998) 
much of this debate is influenced by another non-management discipline, Biology, as 
it mirrors the debate between Gould’s punctuated equilibrium and Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. Our revolutionaries come down on the side of Gould. For Hammer and 
Champy change becomes the most dramatic of activities; “Reengineering can’t be 
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carried out in small and cautious steps” because it involves “tossing aside old systems 
and starting over”. During the revolution, activity is governed by four key words: 
Fundamental, Radical, Dramatic and Process. To translate these words into real action 
the organization must have a process orientation, an ambition for breakthroughs, 
embrace rule breaking and make creative use of information technology. Hamel offers 
a similar prescription. He argues “To be an industry revolutionary, you must develop 
an instinctive capability to think about business models in their entirety … this is 
mental training for industry revolutionaries”. With the mindset comes the revolution: 
“How to start an insurrection ... Build a point of view ... Write a manifesto ... Create a 
coalition ... Pick your targets and pick your moments ... Co-opt and neutralize ... Find 
a translator ... Win small, win early, win often ... Isolate, infiltrate, integrate”.  
 
Rather than being a reflection, this may actually signify a contradiction of the political 
origins of the revolutionary concept. For Hamel and Hammer and Champy, the 
purpose of revolution is to create organizational instability as a direct counter to 
organizational stability; only under these kind of organizational conditions can a firm 
cope with the revolutionary times. However, in the political tradition of Hobbes, for 
example, the purpose was not to impose instability but rather to counter the 
revolution; the role of the Leviathan was to bring order to chaos and not vice versa. 
Within this context, Chaharbaghi and Newman (1996) argue that one of the central 
problems in maintaining a revolution lies in the population profile of the organization. 
Two key groups in the organization are the creators who begin the revolution and the 
stabilizers who manage the organization post-revolution. If the revolutionary process 
is to become permanent then management must always pay attention to the political 
power relationships between these groups. De Wit and Meyer expand on this point 
and draw attention to a major problem for the management revolutionaries; “Humans 
have a strong preference for stability”. Under these conditions, small changes in the 
organization will never be enough and, instead, “a co-ordinated assault is usually 
required”. This shock-therapy approach is endorsed by Hamel who views 
organizational success, not as a one-off revolutionary change, but as a permanent 
process within the organization. The key task is to revolutionize again and again; 
“Unless a company can institutionalize activism, its’ unlikely to be able to meet the 
twin challenges of revolution; reinventing itself and reinventing its’ industry”. 
 
The management revolution literature is, therefore, driven by a compelling logic. 
Times are revolutionary, this must be reflected in the management of the organization 
and the revolution must become permanent because further globalization and 
technological development will make the future even more dramatic than the already 
revolutionary present. This brings us full circle and back to the political 
revolutionaries like Trotsky (1930) who argued; “The completion of the revolution is 
unthinkable … the revolution thereby becomes a permanent revolution”. We can now 
turn to examine these points in more detail through an examination of two examples 
of recent “revolutionary” European change. The case study on the Delor’s Plan and 
developments in the European Union examines the extent to which the European 
business environment has changed during a period of transformation and the Ford 
case study examines the background and process of the company’s European 
Transformation Strategy and the extent to which it can revolutionize the organization. 
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Case Study 1: The Delor’s Plan for a European Revolution 
 
“This large market that we are creating is of direct concern to every 
citizen of Europe. It is revolutionary” Jacques Delors 
 
In the UK, current discussion about the EU tends to focus on the single currency and 
whether or when Britain should join the eurozone. Much of the debate on this issue 
misses the important point that the single currency is only one step in a much longer 
process. The historical origins of this process began in 1957 with the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome that created the (now) European Union. Since 1957, the Union has 
developed in two reasonably distinct phases. The first phase, which lasted up until the 
mid-1980s, focused on widening the Union and saw the number of member states 
grow from 6 to 12 to 15; by 1986 the Union had a consumer market of over 300 
million people. By the mid-1980s, however, this approach had reached its natural 
geographic, economic and political limits and so a new phase in development was 
needed. This second phase of development saw a shift in emphasis away from 
widening towards a deepening of the Union. At the center of this shift was Jacques 
Delors, the President of the European Commission, and the Delor’s Plan for economic 
and monetary union (EMU). 
 
The Delor’s Plan proposed that deepening should happen in 3 stages. Stage 1 was 
launched by the Single European Act and was operationalised in the 1992 
Programme. This stage focused on the completion of the internal market which was to 
be achieved through the removal of the final remaining non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Thus, the 1992 Programme promoted, amongst other things, the removal of customs 
points between member states, the harmonization of technical standards and the 
opening up of government procurement practices in an attempt to facilitate the free 
movement of goods and services within the Union. Having completed the single 
market, Stage 2 aimed to strengthen economic co-operation and co-ordination 
between member states in order to deliver convergence of economic performance in 
preparation for the launch of the single European currency. The final stage was the 
launch of the single currency itself for those member states that (a) fulfilled the 
economic criteria for joining and (b) wanted to join. With just a few exceptions, each 
stage of the Plan has been completed on time. 
 
The rationale for the first stages of the Delor’s Plan was primarily based on research 
evidence provided by the Cost of Non-Europe Survey (1988). Broadly speaking, the 
survey suggested that European business would always be held back from becoming 
globally competitive if the EU remained a fragmented collection of individual states 
(European Economy, 1988). Therefore, EMU was sold as a revolutionary step that 
should be taken because it would bring enormous benefits to European business and 
everyone living in the Union: Improvements to macro-economic conditions and 
performance would filter down to improvements to micro-economic conditions and 
performance. Whilst the survey was huge in its scope, it was popularized through the 
Cecchini Report (1988) that served as a sort of executive summary. 
 
For Cecchini, Stage 1 of the Delor’s Plan was crucial for two reasons. First, it would 
provide massive economic benefits. The Cost of Non-Europe Survey quantified the 
direct and indirect economic benefits of the 1992 Programme as between 4.3 and 
6.4% of GDP. In financial terms, every European consumer would, at worst, be 
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euro500 better off. The second reason why Cecchini supported Stage 1 was that, if 
completed successfully, it would provide momentum for the rest of the EMU project. 
Cecchini argued that “A dramatic new environment awaits consumers and producers 
alike in the integrated community market post 1992”. On a similar note, for others 
1992 could not have come at a better time. “There is a growing sense that Europe, and 
European companies, need, and want, a fresh momentum. A fresh destiny if you want 
a more romantic idiom … after 1992 business in Europe might never be the same 
again” (SRI International, 1988). 
 
Whilst the process of any revolution is always interesting, perhaps a more important 
focus for analysis should be the results of the revolution. Lord Cockfield, Vice-
President of the Commission, argued that the revolutionary changes proposed in the 
Delor’s Plan would deliver “significant inflation free growth and millions of new 
jobs”. In judging the effects of the changes, it is, therefore, reasonable to use these 
criteria and in doing so we need to answer two key questions. First, did the changes 
deliver a significant improvement in European economic performance? Second, did 
the changes deliver a significant improvement in comparative economic performance? 
Over a century and a half after the event, Mau Tse Tung was asked about the effects 
of the French Revolution. His reply was that it was still too early to say. Even with 
this caveat in mind, the economic effects of the Delor’s Plan would seem to have been 
disappointing. 
 
Table 1 considers European economic performance across three distinct time periods. 
The first, 1984-1989, considers performance in the immediate period before the 
launch of the Delor’s Plan and the 1992 Programme. The 1990-1995 series considers 
the immediate impact of the completion of the single market and the final time series, 
1996-2001, examines more recent economic data following Stages 2 and 3. 
 
Table 1: EU Economic Performance 1984-2001 
 Average Growth in 
GDP (%) 
Average Inflation 
Rate (%) 
Average Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
1984-1989 3.0 4.9 9.7 
1990-1995 1.8 4.2 9.5 
1996-2001 2.5 2.1 9.3 
Source: OECD 
 
There can never be any absolute certainty over the outcome of a revolution because, 
by their nature, they operate on the edge of chaos. The broad economic data in Table 
1 offers a mix bag of outcomes and, therefore, raises a number of important issues. 
The main success story is in the significant reduction in inflation which has more than 
halved during this period. However, a logical question to ask is what this low 
inflationary environment has delivered, especially in terms of economic growth and 
job creation. Economic growth in Europe has been poor. Whilst much of the fall in 
economic growth in the early 1990s can be accounted for by the slowdown in the 
global economy, European growth in the late 1990s was still significantly lower than 
it had been at the end of the previous decade. The natural corollary of low economic 
growth must necessarily be difficulties over job creation and, whilst European 
unemployment has fallen, the pace of the fall is neither significant nor dramatic. 
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One of the main foundations of the Delor’s Plan was that the environment in which it 
operated fundamentally influenced the performance of European business. Cecchini 
argued that one of the main effects of these conditions was that “European business 
steps out to confront global competition with lead weights round both feet”. For 
European businesses to become global competitors, they would need similar 
environmental conditions to their main international rivals, particularly from the 
United States. Table 2 provides some comparative economic data on the EU and USA 
and shows that again the results of the revolution are, to date, disappointing as the 
American economy has proved much more adept at delivering low inflation, 
economic growth and new jobs.  
 
Table 2: EU vs USA Economic Performance 1990-2001 
 Index of Real GDP 
Growth 1990 = 100 
Consumer Price 
Index 1990 = 100 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
 EU USA EU USA EU USA 
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.8 5.6 
1991 101.8 99.5 105.1 104.2 8.0 6.8 
1992 103.0 102.6 109.8 107.3 9.1 7.5 
1993 102.7 105.4 113.8 110.5 10.6 6.9 
1994 105.6 109.6 117.3 113.4 10.9 6.1 
1995 108.1 112.5 120.9 116.6 10.5 5.6 
1996 110.0 116.6 124.0 120.0 10.6 5.4 
1997 112.8 121.7 126.6 122.7 10.4 4.9 
1998 116.1 126.9 128.9 124.7 9.7 4.5 
1999 119.1 132.1 130.5 127.4 9.0 4.2 
2000 123.0 137.6 133.8 131.8 8.1 4.0 
2001 125.1 139.1 136.5 135.7 7.8 4.8 
Source: OECD 
 
The broad economic evidence presented suggests that, to date, there has been no 
“prodigious and influential upheaval” (Hobsbawn, 1975) in the European business 
environment. Williams et al. (1989) argue that this is because it was always unlikely 
to happen given the revolutionary means proposed in the Delor’s Plan. They argue 
that this was never really the in any case as it was not about revolution but rather 
momentum. As a result of the stalling of development of the Union by the mid-1980s 
through the limitations reached on widening, the union had become characterized by 
“low wrangling” and the Commission had “a reputation for pointless regulations”. 
The hidden agenda behind the Delor’s Plan was not dramatic change but rather an 
attempt to give the Union something constructive to do. 
 
Case Study 2: Continuous Revolution at Ford Europe: From Ford 2000 
through the ETS to Back to Basics 
 
“Our exciting transformation continues to accelerate” Jac Nasser 
 
This article now turns to the micro-level to examine revolutions in an organizational 
setting. Since the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century an almost universally accepted 
definition of the outcome and objectives of the capitalist firm is to deliver a financial 
surplus to its owners. This is the outcome that the internal processes, regardless of 
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how they are constructed and managed, are aimed at delivering. When this outcome 
fails, the revolutionary school attempts, through processes such as BPR, to reinstate it. 
We would argue that this cannot constitute a revolution for three reasons. First, it 
simply does not cover the scope required of revolution. In defining and explaining the 
nature of political revolutions, Calvert proposed that revolutions are constituted by 
processes, events, programmes and myths and it is the combination of these four 
elements that define the revolution. If attention is paid only to the processes of 
revolution then significant parts of the revolutionary package are ignored. Second, the 
revolution is not about creating a new order but reinforcing and protecting the existing 
one; without changes to the definition of outcome, revolution cannot take place. 
Finally, if it is accepted that outcomes should stay the same, any changes to the 
internal processes are handicapped and limited as the organization will be stuck with 
the same old structural internal conditions, usually expressed in financial terms, that 
cannot be revolutionized. We can develop these points further through an examination 
of Ford Motor Company. 
 
Over the past decade, Ford’s strategy has operated at two levels. There has been a 
global strategy that acts as the main driving force for the whole organization and, 
more recently, there has been a distinct, but not completely separate, strategy for the 
European operations. Whilst this article is concerned with Europe, it is nevertheless 
important to place Ford’s European strategy in a global context. The global strategy, 
Ford 2000, was launched in the early 1990s by then Chief Executive Alex Trotman. 
Updated with the Spirit of Ford initiative in 1999, the strategy has the clear and 
precise objective that Ford should become “the world’s leading consumer company 
for automotive products”. Central to Ford 2000 was the creation of a global 
management structure that would, in particular, more closely integrate the North 
American and European operations. This strategy has been operationalised in a 
number of ways including the creation of the Premier Automotive Group through the 
purchase of brands like Jaguar, Land Rover and Volvo and related diversification 
through the acquisition of companies like Hertz and Kwik Fit. 
 
The key test of a strategy is not in what is written down but rather what is executed. 
For example, Moss Kanter argues that one common problem with global strategies is 
that they may become divorced from what is happening at the local level. Ford 2000 
was supposed to create a global car company with five main characteristics: A strong 
global brand through the blue oval, improved levels of customer satisfaction and 
loyalty, the provider of best value to customers, a flexible and leadership driven 
organization and a benchmark for corporate citizenship. However, by the late 1990s it 
was clear that these were not characteristics to be found in Ford Europe. Simply put, 
for the past 10 years Ford has been in retreat in Europe. The company’s market share 
has been falling constantly since the start of the 1990s. For example, in 1991 Ford 
was the third biggest player in the European industry but by the end of the decade its 
relative position had fallen to fifth. Despite steady, if unspectacular, growth in the car 
market overall, Ford was selling 10% fewer cars at the end of the 1990s than at the 
beginning.  
 
Whilst being fragmented, the European car market is dominated by the five biggest 
national economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK) as, between them, 
these markets account for more than of 80% of all cars sold in the Union. In these 
crucial markets, Ford has been losing significant market share. Over the past 10 years, 
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Ford’s share has fallen from 15 to 12%. Loss of market share in these markets is 
always going to be critical for Ford because the company has been unable to find 
significant growth in the smaller but faster growing national markets of the EU. The 
result of this is that, over the past decade, market share in the Union as a whole has 
fallen from 14 to 11%. Table 3 presents some market share data to illustrate these 
points. 
 
Table 3: Ford’s Market Share in the EU Passenger Car Market (%) 
 EU15 Germany France Italy Spain UK Big 5 
1991 14 12 9 13 14 30 15 
1992 13 10 9 11 17 26 13 
1993 14 11 9 10 16 26 14 
1994 14 12 9 11 18 27 15 
1995 15 12 9 11 19 26 15 
1996 14 12 9 10 17 25 14 
1997 14 13 9 10 15 21 14 
1998 13 12 9 9 13 22 13 
1999 12 9 8 9 13 24 12 
2000 11 9 7 9 13 21 12 
Source: SMMT, ACEA 
 
The most dramatic collapse in market share has occurred in the UK. Historically, this 
has been Ford’s most important national market and performance in the UK is broadly 
indicative of Ford’s overall European retreat. Within the UK, more than 80% of 
Ford’s sales have come from 3 segments: The B segment filled by the Fiesta, the C 
segment filled by the Escort and, more recently, the Focus and the C/D segment 
where the Mondeo was introduced to replace the Sierra. Ford has not been able to find 
a must-have product in any of these segments and the result of this is further erosions 
in market position. For example, the Fiesta’s market share more than halved during 
the last decade and, in the same period, C segment market share fell by 12%. The 
situation has been less critical in the C/D segment where market share has fallen by 
just 2%. The only real success stories enjoyed by Ford over the past 10 years have 
been in the small niche markets for cars like the Ka, Cougar and Galaxy but the size 
of these segments mean that they can never sell in sufficient volume to offset 
reductions elsewhere. 
 
We have argued elsewhere (Williams et al. 1995) that, in the cars business, market 
performance is the crucial determinant of a company’s success or failure. Given 
Ford’s market performance, poor productive and financial performance is a logical 
and necessary outcome. Despite a significant restructuring programme over the past 
few years which has involved the closure of plants in, for example, Portugal, Poland 
and Belarus and significant rationalization of plants in the UK, Ford still has a number 
of productive challenges to overcome. For example, declining sales in the market 
have left Ford with excess capacity estimated at 29% of total capacity compared to a 
15% average across other European manufacturers (Ford Company News). An 
irrefutable equation of management is that declining market share plus low capacity 
utilization must always equal disastrous financial performance. In only 3 years in the 
1990s did the company generate a financial surplus and, over the decade, accumulated 
losses amounted to almost $3.5 billion. 
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Ford’s explanation as to why things have gone wrong is based on four factors. There 
have been insufficient improvements to quality, the launch of new products has been 
poor, there have been blockages in the pipeline of new products and cost reduction 
has not happened at the pace that it should have done (Ford Company News). As a 
direct response to the long-term decline in performance and the perceived causes of 
that decline, in mid-2000 Ford launched the European Transformation Strategy (ETS). 
In common with the Ford 2000 global strategy, central to the ETS is transformation 
through market leadership. However, if Ford 2000 was driven by lofty ambitions, the 
ETS is more of a strategic response to a failing market position and subsequent 
financial crisis. As well as the restoration of financial health, a key objective of the 
ETS is to become different rather than simply better and this difference should deliver 
“quantum improvements” (Ford Company News). In keeping with the company’s 
history, the strategy follows Henry Ford’s maxim that “hard work alone does not 
accomplish much” and so emphasis is placed on innovation, flexibility and diversity.  
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the strategic response of British Leyland to a 
similar, albeit more spectacular, decline in market performance was Michael 
Edwardes “product led recovery” (Williams et al., 1986). Twenty years later the 
centerpiece of the ETS is that recovery will be delivered in the marketplace because 
“transformation will be driven by a flow of exciting new products” (Ford Company 
News). The ETS is to operate in three dimensions: a product dimension with the 
launch of 45 new products in a five year time scale; a distribution dimension aimed at 
making improvements to Ford’s system and processes of delivery to customers and a 
cost reduction dimension which will make a major contribution to the restoration of 
profitability. Operationalisation of the strategy will occur in a number of ways which 
includes new product strategies, intensification of the use of assets, improving 
relationships with customers, enhancing the brand and speeding up the process of 
order to delivery. 
 
The extent to which the ETS can deliver the intended transformation may well depend 
on three factors. First, if the transformation is to be product led, then the market 
conditions in Europe will have a major influence on the outcome of the strategy. The 
second factor is the extent to which the ETS is different and revolutionary compared 
to previous forms of strategy in this business. The final factor is the ability and 
willingness of the company to think in a revolutionary way in order to overcome any 
internal obstacles to transformation and revolution. We can briefly consider each of 
these factors in turn. 
 
The European car market is structurally weak because not only is it approaching 
saturation but also competition is intensifying.  Growth in the park of cars in use in 
Europe to almost 180 million by 2000 raises questions about any future growth in the 
market. With over 1 car on the road for every economically active European, the 
future pattern of growth is likely to be both unsteady and slow. Over the past decade 
the market has followed a pattern of sharp falls on the economic downswing followed 
by a slow recovery on the economic upswing. Over the 1990s the market grew by just 
10%. Table 4 summarises some of the evidence on this issue. 
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Table 4: European Car Market Demand and Saturation 
 EU15 New Car 
Registrations 
(mil) 
Index of New Car 
Registrations 
(1990=100) 
EU15 Park of 
Cars (mil) 
Cars per 
Economically 
Active 
1990 13.124 100   
1991 13.048 99 146.1 0.94 
1992 13.149 100 150.3 0.96 
1993 10.932 83 154.9 0.99 
1994 11.584 88 157.9 1.01 
1995 11.669 89 161.0 1.03 
1996 12.398 94 164.1 1.04 
1997 13.005 99 167.7 1.07 
1998 13.941 106 171.4 1.09 
1999 14.632 111 175.2 1.11 
2000 14.308 109 178.1 1.13 
Source: ACEA 
 
Intensifying competition worsens problems of market saturation in Europe. For 
example, the last five years have seen a resurgence in the fortunes of VW and General 
Motors (mainly at the expense of Ford) and further fragmentation of the market. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of manufacturers in the B segment increased 
from 13 to 15 and the number of competing models from 13 to 21. The situation in the 
C segment, historically Ford’s most important, is more dramatic with the number of 
suppliers increasing from 21 to 24 and the number of models from 36 to 49.  
 
The ETS raises some interesting issues surrounding the difference between strategies 
of innovation (where the objective is to deliver difference) and optimization (where 
the objective is to deliver improvement). With slow growth and intensifying 
competition in the market, the extent to which transformation will occur could depend 
on how innovative the strategy is. The ETS focuses directly on the root causes of poor 
performance and offers a blend of cost recovery and cost reduction strategies such as 
new launch plans, increased attention to fixed costs, more integration between order, 
delivery and the distribution network and increased commonality amongst platforms 
and components. Can a new dish be created with old ingredients? As a post-script to 
the ETS, given that Ford’s North American operations now face similar difficulties to 
the European side of the business, the company has embarked on a global strategy of 
transformation. This global transformation will come about in four different ways. 
First, The ETS will continue. Second, North America will develop a distinctive 
transformation strategy of its own. Third, the non-core businesses will be refocused 
and, finally, the Premier Automotive Group will be expanded. The strategic motto 
chosen by Ford for this global, forward-looking, transformation strategy is “Back to 
Basics” (Ford Motor Company Website). 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
“A tale …  full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” Shakespeare 
 
The aim of this article was to analyse the revolutionary school of management and 
draw attention to the political origins of much of the language that it utilizes. As a 
substantial part of the discussion has centred on the appropriation of language from an 
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outside discourse, a fair question would be about the extent to which this article 
represents nothing more than academic pedantry about the use of words. Our answer 
to this question would be both yes and no. We answer yes because we agree with 
Porter and Teich’s point about the inflation of vocabulary leading to a cheapening of 
the term “revolution”. Similarly, the management revolutionaries ignore Levi’s 
warning about the difference between the naming and the meaning of phenomena. 
 
We would note that there is a similarity between the terminology of the management 
and political revolutionaries that may reflect some superficial similarity in intent. 
Lenin (1982) argued, “revolutions are the locomotives of history. Drive them full 
speed ahead” and this may well have influenced Hammer’s (1996) view that 
“organizations can accommodate the forces of change only by creating and 
institutionalizing a capacity for changing themselves”. On a similar note, Hamel 
focuses on creativity as a key means of revolution; “Unless you and your company 
become adept at business concept innovation, more imaginative minds will capture 
tomorrow’s wealth” which echoes the Trotsky view that “revolution is an expression 
of the impossibility of reconstructing by rational means. Insurrection is an art”. 
 
Whilst we may argue that these similarities in language are somewhat superficial, it 
should not detract from a basic point that the use of language is very important. For 
example, Sillence (1999) examines the relationship between organizational change 
and language. He argues that, in both the management of the change process and in 
any post-rational analysis of the change process, language has a crucial role to play. 
As an illustration of this, the Theory of Political Language Forms can be used to 
explain some of the important effects of the type of language used. Using this 
framework, Sillence argues that language can be instrumental to change as it can 
enhance commitment and motivation, build cohesion and provide a wider view of an 
organization’s interests and direction. Alternatively, Speech Act theorists argue that 
what is said matters, not just because of the form of words used, but also because of 
the intention behind the words used: In making judgments, measurement should be 
made of the results of language as well as the words. 
 
The idea of measuring the intention behind the use of language brings us nicely onto 
the implications for management of these issues. Perhaps a first lesson from the cases 
is to avoid making promises that cannot be kept. The European Union has always 
struggled with the issue of momentum and of having something important to do. 
Without a big project, disillusionment with the Union is always likely to set in given 
the propensity of the Commission to engage in bureaucratic interference in issues of 
great personal aggravation but limited importance. Whilst the Delor’s Plan provided 
something substantial and constructive for the Commission to oversee, it was always 
going to be difficult to see how revolutionary fervor was going to be whipped up by 
relatively bland and technical measures like the harmonization of technical standards 
across member states for the fitting of backseat seatbelts. What was supposed to be 
revolutionary was not so much the process as the outcome. However, disillusionment 
with the Union is unlikely to be overcome when the dramatic new environments 
promised run counter to the everyday experiences of European citizens and 
businesses. 
 
In developing this theme further, the Ford case study also raises difficult issues about 
the limitations of revolution and transformation. Kuhn (1996) argued that science is 
 16 
not the steady cumulative acquisition of knowledge. Instead, science is "a series of 
peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” where “one 
conceptual world view is replaced by another” In science, therefore, revolutions are 
characterized by paradigm shifts. However, the management revolutionaries, in both 
theory and practice, fail to propose the means or theoretical basis for a Kuhnian 
paradigm shift because the underlying fundamentals are, despite the emotive rhetoric, 
never challenged. For example, with the ETS the objective of generating a financial 
surplus for the purposes of shareholder value remains the same and all that is 
proposed is normal management wrapped up in a rhetorical and ideological spin. A 
key assumption of the revolutionary school is that of the manager as revolutionary 
and agent of change. We have argued elsewhere (see Williams et al., 1994 and 1995, 
Adcroft and Willis, 2000) that in the cars business the most important determinant of 
success and failure is not the role played by management but rather the external 
market conditions faced. Market conditions of saturation, slow growth and 
intensifying competition severely limit the ability of firms to either reduce costs 
internally or improve cost recovery from the market. Therefore, when structural 
conditions in the market turn against the firm, transformation is difficult if not 
impossible and this is especially so when the vehicle of transformation is a reworking 
of traditional cost reduction and cost recovery strategies. 
 
Brinton argues that revolutions can be useful if they “destroy wicked people and 
useless institutions” which raises a certain irony about the revolutionary school of 
management. If only the strong can survive the fever of revolutionary change, why is 
it mainly the weak who latch onto the revolutionary guru’s exhortations and try to 
implement them? Gramsci (1971) suggests that the successful prosecution of a 
revolution requires two equally import and mutually supportive processes; the war of 
position and the war of manoevre. The war of position is about knocking down the 
foundations and earthworks of the existing system and is an essential precursor to the 
war of manoeuvre, which is more traditionally associated with revolutionary activity.  
In our management context, the lesson is that unless the war of position is won, the 
war of manoeuvre will always fail. We would argue that organizations like Ford have 
gone for a war of manoeuvre precisely because they are losing the war of position. 
 
More than anything else all this may illustrate that there is only a tenuous link 
between management research and the world of the practitioner. In considering some 
of the implications for management research, a case can be made against the 
inappropriate appropriation of theories and models from other discourses that soon 
become little more than clichés. As Hammer and Champy point out “reengineering 
has become part of the common parlance in the business press, on radio and television 
news and talk shows, in conversation; it has even become a sales pitch for some 
products and services. Unfortunately, many people who use the word don’t 
understand it. Consequently a lot of half-right ideas and some plain nonsense are 
being passed off these days as reengineering”. There is a certain irony in this. Just as 
Hammer and Champy are sent into a spin by the inappropriate appropriation of their 
ideas, perhaps the real revolution fostered by their work could be found in Marx, 
Trotsky and Lenin turning in their graves. 
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